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Most of Everything is Nothing

November 11, 2008 by Michael Nugent

Large Hadron Collider at CERN - Photo by CERN (cc)

After I posted this series of articles about why I assume that reality is basically as it seems after applying reason to the evidence of my senses, I got a nice email from Bob Rees, who pointed out that:

Nothing is what it appears to our puny senses. 99.999999999999 per cent of the volume of ordinary matter, say, a concrete block, is empty space. And even the things we see and touch have to be interpreted by our brains before they ‘mean’ anything to us.

Bob is correct. Everything around us seems to be made up of tiny particles of matter called quarks and leptons, plus huge amounts of empty space, plus invisible substances called dark matter, all being moved around by energy forces like electromagnetism and gravity. 

  • Atoms are incredibly tiny. A single grain of sand contains sixty million million million atoms. 
  • Quarks are even tinier than atoms. If an atom was enlarged to the size of the planet earth, then each quark at the centre of it would be smaller than a tennis ball. 
  • Leptons are even tinier than quarks, if you can imagine one geometric point being smaller than another. The most familiar lepton is the electron.
  • Empty space makes up nearly all of every atom. Returning to our imaginary giant atom, you have clusters of quarks, each quark smaller than a tennis ball, in the middle; then a huge sphere of empty space the size of the planet earth; then a cloud cover of tiny electrons around the surface.

Here are some more fascinating details of the tiny particles of matter inside each atom:

Quarks cluster together in groups, called protons and neutrons, which form the nucleus of an atom. The atom is completed when this nucleus is surrounded by a cloud of leptons called electrons. Then huge amounts of tiny atoms combine to form either a millimetre-wide grain of sand in Cairo, or a hundred-metre-high Redwood tree in California, or a medium-sized human body such as yours.

CERN 70x120Atoms are incredibly tiny. A single grain of sand contains sixty million million million atoms. If you were to count these atoms, taking a second to count each one, it would take you two million million years. Now, that’s not practical, as you would need lunch-breaks and time to sleep and you may not even live for two million million years. So, if you hired other people to help you do this counting, and they all counted non-stop for an average eight-hour five-day working week, without any holidays, then the entire population of the world could spend their entire working lives to count just one twentieth of the atoms in one single grain of sand.

CERN 70x120Quarks are even tinier than atoms. If an atom was enlarged to the size of the planet earth, then each quark at the centre of it would be smaller than a tennis ball. Quarks are so tiny that physicists treat them as geometric points that do not even have a physical size, though they do have a tiny mass and a tiny electrical charge. Quarks cluster together in groups of three, to form either a proton (which has a positive electrical charge) or a neutron (which has no electrical charge). Some atoms contain more quarks than others: Hydrogen, the lightest atom, has just one proton and one neutron; while gold has 79 protons and 118 neutrons.

CERN 70x120Leptons are even tinier than quarks, if you can imagine one geometric point being smaller than another. The most familiar lepton is the electron, which moves at over 1,000 miles a second. Each electron has a tiny negative electrical charge, which causes it to be pulled towards any nearby proton, which has a positive electrical charge. Most of the time, an electron is just a tiny cloud of possible locations where the electron might actually be. This tiny cloud surrounds the nucleus of an atom, and tries to get as close as it can to a proton within it. Then the cloud settles at a certain distance away, based on the energy level of the electron. 

CERN 70x120Empty space makes up nearly all of every atom. Returning to our imaginary giant atom, you have clusters of quarks, each quark smaller than a tennis ball, in the middle; then a huge sphere of empty space the size of the planet earth; then a cloud cover of tiny electrons around the surface. Now reduce this imaginary giant atom to its proper size, so that sixty million million million of them fit into a grain of sand. Then combine lots of these tiny bundles to form stones and trees, ants and whales, tables and computers, planets and stars. And you realise that nearly all of everything is actually nothing. The idea that everyday objects are solid matter is only an illusion.

In a later article, I’ll look at the question of how energy causes these tiny particles to move, and why we don’t fall through the floor with every step that we take. But in the meantime, sit back and marvel at the fascinating worlds with a world that exist within every grain of sand.

Photo: Large Hadron Collider at CERN by CERN (cc)

Postscript: The photo above is part of the Large Hadron Collider project at CERN in Switzerland. Tiny protons are sent hurtling around a 27 km long underground tunnel at almost the speed of light, to investigate what happens when they collide together. For scale, see the man at the centre of the bottom of the main photo.

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Reality is Basically as it Seems

June 22, 2008 by Michael Nugent

Faces of the City by CW Buecheler (cc)This is the third article in a series about why I assume that reality is basically as it seems to be. In the first article, I explained why I believe nothing can be objectively known. In the second article, I described five possible theories of reality.

This third article examines the patterns in the five theories of reality, and concludes that:

1. Each new scenario seems closer to the evidence of my experience.
2. Each assumes the existence of extra things that cannot be known to exist.
3. Each seems increasingly functional as a working assumption of reality.
4. These apparent patterns contain a key ‘on/off’ reason-switch.
5. This leads me to assume that reality is basically as it seems to be.

And here is the detail of how I arrive at this assumption:

1. Each new scenario seems closer to the evidence of my experience.

This is the first of three patterns that these possible scenarios seem to follow.

(a) In the first scenario, all that seems to exist, even what seem to be thoughts, may an illusion. This scenario seems so far away from the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’ as to be incompatible with it.

(b) Gradually extra entities are assumed to exist (‘thoughts’, ‘thinking beings’, physical objects). Each of these seems to match with parts of the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’.

(c) In the final scenario, all permutations of thoughts are combined with real physical objects. This makes the nature of reality identical to the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’.

2. Each new scenario assumes the existence of extra things that cannot be known to exist.

This is the second of three patterns that these possible scenarios seem to follow.

(a) In the first scenario, all that seems to exist, even what seem to be thoughts, may an illusion. This is the easiest to defend using reason alone, because it makes no definitive challengeable assertion.

(b) Gradually extra entities are assumed to exist (‘thoughts’, ‘thinking beings’, physical objects) that cannot be known to exist. Each of these assumptions makes each scenario a step harder to defend using reason alone.

(c) The final scenario has the greatest number of ‘entities that are assumed to exist but cannot be known to exist.’ This makes it the hardest scenario to defend using reason alone.

3. Each new scenario seems increasingly functional as a working assumption of reality.

This is the third of three patterns that these possible scenarios seem to follow.

This third pattern depends on something being assumed to exist. If everything is an illusion, then the illusory ‘me’ is at no disadvantage by virtue of being an illusion, because what seems to be ‘everything else’ is also an illusion.

(a) Stage one: ‘independent thoughts’ or another ‘thinking being’ are assumed to exist, but ‘I’ am not. This renders meaningless any attempts by the illusory ‘me’ to analyse or choose or do anything.

(b) Stage two: I am assumed to exist, as the sole ‘thinking being’. I can now seek to analyse and choose and do things, but cannot communicate as nobody else exists.

(c) Stage three: I and other ‘thinking beings’ are assumed to exist. I can now function in much the way that I seem to, based on the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’. This allows me to have a meaningful working assumption of reality.

At any of these three stages, the real or illusory ‘me’ can function in much the same way irrespective of whether the physical objects are real or illusory. This is because, at each stage, my real interaction with real physical objects seems functionally identical to ‘my’ illusory interactions with illusory physical objects.

4. These apparent patterns contain a key ‘on/off’ reason-switch.

In terms of making a working assumption about the nature of reality, the biggest conflict is not whether physical objects or gods are assumed to exist. It is whether anything is assumed to exist that cannot be known to exist, using reason alone.

In other words, the switch is turned to ‘on’ once it is assumed that anything at all exists. This may not even be ‘thoughts’; it may be something that seems to be ‘thoughts’ but is actually something else. But as long as it is assumed that that something exists, and it cannot be known to exist, the switch has been turned to ‘on’.

If it is assumed that it is self-evident that something must exist, then the switch is turned to on once something identifiable is assumed to exist that cannot be known to exist. Depending on the rational faculties of the ‘assumer’, this could be when ‘thoughts’, a ‘thinking being’ or ‘me’ is assumed to exist.

5. This leads me to assume that reality is fundamentally as it seems to be.

Once ‘I’ turn on this switch, ‘I’ have assumed in principle that “things-that-cannot-be-known-to-exist” may exist. What then might these things be?

Experience and Reason: Once I assume that anything exists, it is now rational to assume that reality consists of those specific things which seem both (a) most consistent with the apparent evidence of my experience, and (b) most likely to be the case, based on applying reason to the apparent evidence of my senses.

This leads me towards the final scenario of my five theories of reality: it includes me as a thinking entity, you and other thinking entities, thoughts that are generated by me and you and other thinking entities, and real physical objects, whether animate or inanimate. It is not rational to assume that some, but not all, of these exist.

Also, it is not rational to assume that specific things exist if they are either (a) less consistent than other possibilities with the apparent evidence of my experience, or (b) less likely to be the case than other possibilities, based on applying reason to the apparent evidence of my senses. This includes unicorns, leprechauns and gods.

Functionality: This argument is strengthened if it results in a working assumption that makes it easier for ‘me’ to function in what seems to be reality. This also leads towards the final scenario of my five theories of reality, where ‘I’ am assumed to exist and interact with other thinking beings and physical objects.

It does not matter if ‘I’ am wrong in this assumption. If so, ‘I’ will just seem to cause the same things to happen as would happen anyway.

So, for practical reasons as well as theoretical ones, my working assumption is that reality is basically as it seems to be, based on applying reason to the apparent evidence of my senses, while remaining open to changing my specific beliefs if I become aware of new evidence.

Reality is Basically as it Seems to Be

Note that I am assuming that reality is basically as it seems to be, not that every detail of reality is actually as it seems to be. I am saying that:

(a) It is reasonable to assume that we exist as thinking, sentient beings in a world of real actual objects.

(b) It is reasonable to assume that the specifics of reality are those theories that are closest to the evidence of our experience, and that seem most likely after applying reason to that evidence.

(c) It is reasonable to always be prepared to change our assumptions if we get new evidence, but not until then.

Photo: Faces of the City by CW Buecheler (cc)

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Five Possible Theories of Reality

June 22, 2008 by Michael Nugent

How? by Not So Good Photography (cc)This is the second article in a series about why I assume that reality is basically as it seems to be. In the first article, I explained why I believe nothing can be objectively known. This second article deals with a sequence of five possible theories of what reality might consist of:

1. All that seems to exist, even what seem to be thoughts, may be an illusion.
2. Only independent thoughts exist. No separate being thinks them; the thoughts just exist by themselves.
3. Only one thinking being and its thoughts exist. The thoughts only exist when the being is thinking them.
4. Several thinking beings and their thoughts exist. The beings can interact with each other telepathically.
5. Real physical objects also exist, in conjunction with any of the above scenarios.

Here is an overview of each of these possibilities, and how each one fits in with my experience, my use of reason and the practicalities of living my life.

Theory 1: All that seems to exist, even what seem to be thoughts, may be an illusion.

Overview: This is the most cautious assumption of reality. Thoughts seem the most certain entities to exist, but maybe they only seem to be thoughts. Maybe they do not even exist. Maybe nothing actually exists except the illusion of existence itself.

Experience: This scenario seems the furthest away from the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’, to the extent of seeming incompatible with ‘my experience’.
Reason:
This seems to involve a paradox. However, ‘I’ cannot rationally rule it out as I have no way of disproving it or of proving any alternative. Maybe this scenario is correct, but what seems to be ‘my thinking’ cannot comprehend how. This is the easiest scenario to defend using reason alone, because it makes no definitive challengeable assertion.
Functionality:
As a working assumption of reality, this enables the illusory ‘me’ to function in what seems to be the same way as the real ‘me’ would if everything did exist. The illusory ‘me’ is at no disadvantage by virtue of being an illusion, because what seems to be ‘everything else’ is also an illusion.


Theory 2: Only independent thoughts exist. No separate being thinks them; the thoughts just exist by themselves.

Overview: If this is correct, then the illusion of ‘me’ is simply part of ‘the thoughts.’ This illusory ‘me’ cannot understand how this technically works, but this may be because ‘understanding how this works’ is not part of the ‘the thoughts.’

Experience: Assuming the actual existence of something (in this case, the ‘independent thoughts’) this scenario seems the furthest away from what the evidence of my experience. What ‘I’ seem to experience is an illusion, and so is ‘me’. What ‘you’ may seem to experience is an illusion, and so is ‘you’. What then is the relationship of the illusory ‘me’ and ‘you’ to the ‘independent thoughts’? An analogy is that the ‘independent thoughts’ are a computer programme, and ‘me’ and ‘you’ are some lines of code in that programme.
Reason:
Of the scenarios that make a challengeable assertion (by assuming the actual existence of something), this seems the easiest to defend using reason alone. This is because it involves the fewest entities that are “assumed to exist without knowing that they exist,” i.e. the ‘independent thoughts’. This means there are fewest points of attack where the ‘independent thoughts’ (or indeed the illusory ‘me’ or ‘you’) are obliged to prove anything.
Functionality:
As a working assumption of reality, this scenario renders meaningless any attempts to analyse or choose or do anything. The ‘independent thoughts’ are, in effect, in control. Whatever the illusory ‘me’ or ‘you’ seems to decide, the ‘independent thoughts’ just continue to do whatever they would have been doing anyway.

Theory 3: Only one thinking being and its thoughts exist. The thoughts only exist when the being is thinking them.

Overview: If this is correct, there are three sub-possibilities.

(a) Only I, Michael Nugent, exist. My thinking has generated the illusions of me having written this paragraph, and of ‘you’ existing and reading this. An analogy is that Michael Nugent is a computer programmer, and ‘you’ are some lines of code in a computer programme that he has written.

(b) Only you, the person who seems to be reading this paragraph, exist. Your thinking has generated the illusions of ‘Michael Nugent’ existing and writing this paragraph, and of you reading this. An analogy for this relationship is that you are a computer programmer, and ‘Michael Nugent’ is some lines of code in a computer programme that you have written.

(c) Only another thinking being exist. Its thinking has generated the illusions of ‘Michael Nugent’ existing and writing this paragraph, and of ‘you’ existing and reading this. An analogy is that the ‘thinking being’ is a computer programmer, and ‘Michael Nugent’ and ‘you’ are some lines of code in a computer programme that it has written.

The sole ‘thinking being’ (whichever one of ‘us’ it may be) has also generated the illusion of all of the world’s literature, history, art, sport, civilisations, wars, knowledge, pleasure, pain and ongoing events. This being is what some people (if they existed) might call a god. That said, if you are the sole ‘thinking being’, you might consider generating a higher standard of illusory life for yourself.

Experience: Because some ‘thinking being’ is assumed to exist, this scenario seems another step closer to the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’.
Reason:
It also seems another step harder to defend using reason alone. Another entity (you or me or another ‘thinking being’) is assumed to exist that cannot be known to exist, i.e. its existence cannot be proved using reason alone.
Functionality:
As a working assumption of reality, this may considerably boost the self-esteem of whichever ‘thinking being’ is assumed to exist. It also renders meaningless any attempts to debate or communicate anything, because nobody exists to communicate with. The thinker’s apparent disagreements with ‘other people’ are really internal arguments between the thinker’s own thoughts.

Theory 4: Several thinking beings and their thoughts exist. The beings can interact with each other telepathically.

Overview: You and I and others exist as ‘thinking beings’. We generate the illusion of sensory experiences, using our thinking, and we interact telepathically in a universe with no physical entities. However, there are limits to what our thinking can do. For example, each of us still seems to cease to exist (or ‘die’) at some stage, and we only seem able to communicate some thoughts and not others. We do not know why we all generate (more or less) the same illusions of sensory experiences, but this may be simply the way things happened to pan out.

Experience: Because the ‘thinking beings’ can communicate with each other, this scenario seems another step closer to the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’.
Reason:
It also seems another step harder to defend using reason alone. Many entities (the interacting ‘thinking beings’) are assumed to exist that cannot be known to exist, i.e. their existence cannot be proved using reason alone.
Functionality:
As a working assumption of reality, this enables me to function and interact with others, in what seems to be the same way as I would if our bodies and other objects actually existed. For example, we only seem able to transmit some thoughts and not others, and these ‘transmittable thoughts’ seem to correspond to those that we would communicate through our senses, if our senses existed.

Theory 5: Real physical objects also exist, in conjunction with any of the above scenarios.

Overview:
Adding real physical entities to any of the above scenarios, such as atoms and rocks and trees and human bodies and bicycles and microwave ovens and space rockets and planets and galaxies.

Experience: Adding real physical entities to any scenario brings it another step closer to the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’. The effect is greatest with scenario four, which combines thinking beings, their thoughts, and interaction between the thinking beings. Here, adding real physical entities makes the nature of reality identical to the apparent evidence of ‘my experience’.
Reason: Adding real physical entities also makes each scenario another step harder to defend using reason alone, by assuming extra entities that cannot be known to exist.
Functionality: As a working assumption of reality, the real or illusory ‘me’ can function (in each scenario) in much the same way irrespective of whether the physical objects are real or illusory. This is because, in each scenario, my real interaction with real physical objects seems functionally identical to ‘my’ illusory interactions with illusory physical objects.

Assumption Based on These Theories

In the next article in this series, I will explain - based on these theories - why I assume that reality is basically as it seems to be.

Photo: How? by Not So Good Photography (cc)

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Nothing Can Be Objectively Known

June 20, 2008 by Michael Nugent

The Thinker by Brian Progressive Spin (cc)This is the first article in a series about why I assume two things about reality: (1) that nothing can be objectively known, and (2) that reality is basically as it seems to be. This article is about the first of those assumptions - that nothing can be objectively known.

This is a summary of why nothing can be known:
1. I seem to interpret the universe, and make assumptions, using my thinking.
2. But I can never know if any of my interpretations or assumptions are correct.
3. It is possible that this assumption may itself be incorrect.
4. However, that possibility does not prove that anything can be known.

And here is the detail of each of these points:

1. I seem to interpret the universe, and make assumptions, using my thinking.

The universe is all that exists, whether thoughts or things. Some of these:

■ I am aware of experiencing (conscious thoughts, my house, eating ice cream)
■ I experience but am not aware of (subconscious thoughts, my 42nd eyelash)
■ I am aware of but do not experience (composing an opera, visiting the moon)
■ I neither experience nor am aware of (thoughts I have not had, specific aliens)

These entities seem to change, combine and interact in complex ways. I must therefore interpret my awareness of them, then make assumptions based on my interpretations. I call the mechanism with which I do this, ‘my thinking’.

2. But I can never know if any of my interpretations or assumptions are correct.

Why? Because I can only interpret their correctness by using the very mechanism whose ‘efficiency-in-being-correct’ that I am testing (i.e. ‘my thinking’).

■ If I assume that my thinking always produces correct interpretations, then this assumption may itself be an incorrect interpretation, caused by flaws in my thinking about which I am unaware.
■ If I doubt my thinking’s reliability in always producing correct interpretations, then I must also doubt its reliability in testing the correctness of those interpretations.

3. It is possible that this assumption may itself be incorrect.

■ It may be that something can be known, using mechanisms other than ‘my thinking’, and that ‘I’ am simply not yet aware of how this can be done.
■ If I am shown a proof that ‘something can be known’, then I will change this assumption.

4. However, that possibility does not prove that anything can be known.

■ To prove that ‘something can be known’, it is not sufficient to undermine the certainty of this or any theory of why ‘nothing can be known’.
■ Indeed, undermining the certainty of this assumption can reinforce it, unless the undermining is accompanied by a positive alternative proof.

■ To prove that ‘something can be known’, the onus is on the ‘knowledge-claimer’ to show how this can be done, using a proof that does not rely on the very thinking that is itself being tested.
■ Until this happens, this seems the safest and purest working assumption to make about the nature of the universe: that, based on what seems to be my experience so far of the universe, nothing can be known.

Five Possible Theories of Reality

In the next article in this series, I will examine five possible theories of what reality might consist of.

Photo: The Thinker by Brian - Progressive Spin (cc)

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